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viable responses to the one transcendent, divine Reality. 
C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Religion, by John Beversluis. Grand 
Rapids: William R. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985. Pp. XIV + 182. 
$9.95 (paper). 
THOMAS V. MORRIS, University of Notre Dame. 
Not many good philosophers are great writers. Not many good writers are great 
philosophers. But an exceptional writer who addresses philosophical and religious 
topics with verve and style, whose books are well marketed, and who succeeds 
in touching people's lives can on occasion be acclaimed a great philosopher by 
the appreciative reading public who have benefited from his writing, a judgment 
which may sometimes be far out of line with the properly philosophical merits 
of his thought. 
Some professional philosophers find themselves with an ambivalent attitude 
toward such an author's success. While grateful for whatever good he has man-
aged to effect in the lives of his readers, they regret the confusion of rhetoric 
with philosophy pervading the public reception of his work. Other professional 
philosophers find themselves hardly ambivalent at all, but are just irked at the 
situation. Having worked hard at philosophy for years, having come to understand 
the difficulty of ever proving anything by pure reason alone, and having reconciled 
themselves to living with the uncertainties of this world, they are more than a 
little irritated to see their students and the general reading public idolizing some 
good writer as a great philosopher who has proved this, that, and everything 
else of real philosophical significance, when it is clear to a trained eye that no 
such results have been attained at all. The tone of his book indicates that this is 
precisely how John Beversluis perceives and reacts to the phenomenon of C. S. 
Lewis' extraordinary popularity as a Christian apologist and writer. 
This book actually begins with a measured, judicious, even appreciative tone 
of presentation. But it soon changes into a somewhat shrill, harsh, strident assault 
which ends up portraying Lewis as something of a pathetic figure whose blustery 
posturing as a rational apologist for Christian truth finally gave way at the end 
of his life to a desperate faith-against-all-odds held onto only by means of blatant 
philosophical inconsistency. Beversluis is concerned to blow the whistle on the 
Lewis myth, and as a professional guardian of philosophical truth, to protect the 
general public from Lewis' egregious logical errors. He says this of the Lewis 
reading public: 
The people to whom he primarily addresses himself are not trained in 
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philosophy; they are on the whole simply not in a position to recognize 
his distortions, omissions, and oversimplifications. (89) 
It is Beversluis' aim to put his readers into a position where they can see Lewis' 
failures. In representative passages, he characterizes Lewis' "irresponsible writ-
ing" (40) as exhibiting "a persistent tendency toward carelessness, inaccuracy, 
and oversimplification whenever he discusses opposing views" (42), and blasts 
Lewis' own positive positions and arguments with such epithets as 'confused,' 
'wrongheaded,' 'shipwrecked,' 'disgraced,' 'considerably worse than fuzzy,' 
'tendentious,' and 'desperate.' Colorful passages in Lewis are labelled as 'belli-
cose outbursts,' and we find that Lewis doesn't just state his opinions on controv-
ersial matters, he "gives vent" to them. The overall tone should be evident. 
Beversluis' method is to isolate individual apologetic arguments in Lewis' 
writings and, taking his statements at face value, to employ the sorts of distinctions 
we introduce to first semester philosophy students to show those arguments to 
be unsound. Often we find the sort of barrage of questions leveled at one of 
Lewis' arguments which a tutor will sometimes direct at a careless student. The 
net assessment is that none of Lewis' reasons for believing there is a God is any 
good, and that in addition he has no good response to the most popular argument 
for believing there is no God, the problem of evil. 
My main overall philosophical criticism of this book is that Beversluis seldom 
comes anywhere near to digging deep enough to really appreciate a line of 
thought suggested by Lewis. All too often he gives a facile, fairly superficial 
reconstruction of a line of argument, and after subjecting it to some critical 
questioning, declares it bankrupt and moves on. What is so disappointing to the 
reader who is trained in philosophy is that in most such instances a few minutes 
of reflective thought suffice to see that there are very interesting considerations 
to be marshalled in the direction Lewis was heading, considerations altogether 
neglected by the author. There are far too many false alternatives posed for 
Lewis' arguments, and hasty judgments rendered about their soundness. In short, 
it seems that Beversluis is guilty of precisely those shortcomings in polemical 
discussion he attributes to Lewis. 
Some of the main lines of thought Lewis produced as indicating the truth of 
a theistic world view, Beversluis treats as deductive arguments meant to prove 
the proposition that there is a God. This in itself is, I think, a mistake. As is 
well known nowadays, a philosophical argument can have force without being 
a deductive proof. But even more damaging to the prospects of a fair assessment 
of Lewis are Beversluis' oversights concerning the ways in which the details of 
the arguments themselves could be defended. In some places, for example, Lewis 
seems to suggest that human beings have a deep longing or desire which can be 
determined to be a desire for the divine, or for God. It cannot be satisfied by 
BOOK REVIEWS 321 
any worldly object and is such that its very existence is a pointer to the reality 
of its proper object, an eternal divine being. Such arguments occur elsewhere 
in philosophy: We have an innate desire for everlasting life; innate desires are 
usually in principle satisfiable, and so their existence points to the existence of 
their proper object; so, probably, there is such a thing as everlasting life. Regard-
less of what we think of such arguments at first glance, sophisticated versions 
of them are possible which employ the basic apparatus of confirmation theory, 
and which deserve a careful hearing. Beversluis just states concerning any such 
desire, apparently, that "The desire in and of itself proves nothing, points to 
nothing," (19) as if that were all that needs to be said. 
Further, Beversluis argues that if C. S. Lewis' own deepest desire had been 
for God, he would not, according to his own testimony, have been a reluctant 
convert. Likewise, if we all had a deep desire for God we would recognize it 
as such. We don't, so there is no such desire. But of course, God could be the 
cause and the only proper, complete satisfaction of the deepest need in the human 
heart without its being the case at all that he must be immediately recognizable 
as such by any person in just any spiritual or moral condition whatsoever. It is 
hard to see how Beversluis could ignore this possibility. But then, in another 
context, Beversluis characterizes the claim that a person's whole condition (at-
titudes, emotions, etc.) is relevant to what he can see in religious matters as a 
claim that seems "to imply that in the pursuit of truth it is not so much solid 
arguments as sunny dispositions that are decisive" (52). So perhaps his neglect 
of this possibility is not so surprising after all. 
C. S. Lewis, of course, was not just a theist, he was a Christian. And one of 
his best known arguments was an argument for the divinity of Christ. Sometimes 
known as the Lewis Trilemma, Beversluis discusses it only as a dilemma. It 
goes something like this: Even non-Christians recognize Jesus as a great moral 
teacher. But he claimed to be God. So either he was a colossal liar, which is 
inconsistent with the assessment of him as a great moral force, or he really 
believed in his own deity, in which case he was either a lunatic on the level of 
a man, Lewis says, who believes he is a poached egg-a state also grossly 
incompatible with his moral leadership-or he was and is God, the Lord of 
Creation. Liar, Lunatic, or Lord-which was he? A positive assessment of his 
other teachings forces one to a positive assessment of his apparent self-understand-
ing. Such is the argument, roughly put. 
When disagreeing with assumptions Lewis makes here about the general relia-
bility of the New Testament text, assumptions shared by many contemporary 
scholars of a traditional bent, Beversluis gratuitously states that "he is a textually 
careless and theologically unreliable guide" (54). But textual issues aside, 
Beversluis argues that even if Jesus did claim to be God, the only alternative to 
his honest deity is not something like lunacy. We are not forced to a Lunatic or 
322 Faith and Philosophy 
Lord decision, Beversluis says. Consider the reaction to Jesus in his own time, 
he suggests. How did the unbelievers of his time react? Did they brand him a 
lunatic? No, they branded him a blasphemer. It was perfectly sane, given Judaic 
messianic expectations, for someone to be believed the messiah, or even for 
someone to believe of himself that he was the messiah, without questions of 
lunacy arising at all, Beversluis suggests. So a false belief in his own deity 
would not, in the original context, be good grounds for our judging Jesus insane. 
But the Jewish expectations for a messiah at the time in question were not 
expectations for God himself, for a literally divine person, to visit Jerusalem. 
They were expectations of a special ambassador or political deliverer to be raised 
up by God. To claim to be such a messiah would indeed not be decisive grounds 
for an insanity judgment. But this was not Jesus' self-assessment as portrayed 
on occasion in the New Testament documents. It is clearly deity that is at issue. 
And Beversluis' remarks fail altogether to undermine the Lewis reasoning based 
on this assumption. The argument certainly requires more scrutiny and comment; 
it cannot be so easily dismissed. 
I can sympathize with the intent behind Beversluis' project. In one place he 
makes a remark about Lewis' BBC talks on which some of his written work is 
based, which could be extended to the written apologetic corpus as a whole: 
My complaint about the Broadcast Talks is not that Lewis fails to be 
as thorough as his subject matter demands, but that he gives the impres-
sion of being thorough. The philosophically unsophisticated reader 
cannot fail to get the impression that Lewis is covering the ground, that 
he is doing justice to the Tllaterial, and that he is compressing everything 
that needs to be said into highly compact but basically accurate form, 
when in fact he is not doing so at all. 
While not necessarily sharing Beversluis' assessment of Lewis here, I share his 
general concern about the way in which some apologetics is done, and received. 
Indeed, that is why I wrote my own first book, a critique of a very popular 
evangelical apologist. I And, as someone who has attempted the same sort of 
task, I must say that much of Beversluis' book is well written from a purely 
stylistic point of view. He is clearly a good writer. Especially when writing 
about Lewis' views on the problem of evil, he is probing and provocative, 
although there again, I believe, in error. In a purely literary way, the book is a 
fairly good read, but I am afraid that it is academically one I cannot highly 
recommend, either in its tone or in the depth of its philosophical argumentation. 
NOTES 
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